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Summary findings
Saggi surveys the literature  on trade and foreign direct  be horizontal - when it may be vertical.) All such
investment -especially  wholly owned subsidiaries of  studies do find the subsidiaries of multinationals to be
multinational firms and international joint ventures - more productive than domestic firms, so foreign direct
as channels for technology transfer. He also discusses  investment does result in host countries using resources
licensing and other arm's-length channels of technology  more effectively.
transfer. He concludes:  * Absorptive capacity in the host country is essential
* How trade encourages growth depends on whether  for getting significant benefits from foreign direct
knowledge spillover is national or international.  Spillover  investment. Without  adequate human capital or
is more likely to be national for developing countries  investments in research and development, spillover fails
than for industrial countries.  to materialize.
* Local policy.  often makes pure foreign direct  *  A country's  policy on protection of intellectual
investment infeasible, so foreign firms choose licensing  property rights affects the type of industry it attracts.
or joint ventures. The jury is still out on whether  Firms for which such rights are crucial (such as
licensing or joint ventures lead to more learning by local  pharmaceutical firms) are unlikely to invest directly in
firms.  countries where such protections  are weak, or will not
* Policies designed to attract foreign direct investment  invest in manufacturing and research and development
are proliferating.  Several plant-level studies have failed to  activities. Policy on intellectual property rights also
find positive spillover from foreign direct investment to  influences whether technology transfer comes through
firms competing directly with subsidiaries of  licensing, joint ventures, or the establishment of wholly
multinationals. (However, these studies treat foreign  owned subsidiaries.
direct investment as exogenous and assume spillover to
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free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Rina Bonfield, room MC3-354,
telephone 202-473-1248,  fax 202-522-3518,  email address abonfield(@worldbank.org. Policy Research Working Papers
are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  wwwv.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
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*This paper is intended to serve as a background  paper for the World Bank's "Microfoundations  of
International  Technology  Diff-usion,"  research  project.  I thank Amy  Glass,  Benard Hoekman,  Aart  Kraay,
Aaditya  Mattoo,  Howard  Pack, and Jim Tybout  for helpful  comments.1. Introduction
It is well understood that economic growth results either from accumulation of factors of
production or from improvements in technology or both. To encourage the  generation of new
knowledge,  industrialized  countries have elaborate systems of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in
place and  conduct majority of  the  world's  research  and  development (R&D).  Technologies
resulting from such R&D spread throughout the world through a  multitude of channels. At  a
fundamental level, one can draw a distinction  between international trade in technology and other
indirect channels of international technology transfer  such as trade  in goods and  international
movement of factors of production. This paper critically surveys the literature that explores the
role of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) as channels of international technology  transfer.'
With respect to FDI, a distinction is made between wholly owned subsidiaries of multinational
firms and international  joint ventures. Furthermore, FDI is contrasted with arms length channels of
technology  transfer such as licensing.
The paper argues that while the literature has done a decent job of outlining the various
potential channels through which international technology transfer occurs, not enough is known,
both in theory and practice, about the relative importance of each of these channels. 2 This lack of
knowledge automatically  limits our understanding of the role policy plays in facilitating the process
of international  technology transfer. For exarnple, the literature still continues to debate whether
increased openness to trade encourages economic  growth. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, few
economists  advocate the imposition of trade restrictions. 3 In fact, the general feeling seems to be
that traditional analyses may very well understate the true cost of protectionism since most such
analyses utilize static models and ignore the dynamic costs of trade protection. Underlying this
view is the notion, that, somehow, trade of goods and services, foreign direct investment (FDI) and
interaction among countries in various other forms all play a crucial role in improving not only the
global allocation of physical resources but also in transmitting technology globally. However, how
' To restrict the focus of the paper, the international  movement  of labor (for example,  the process  of
reverse  brain drain and movement  of consultants)  is not discussed.
2 Purely  for the sake  of clarity,  the paper refers  to the spread  of know-how  across  countries  as international
technology  transfer  and within a country  as technology  diffusion.
3  See Dollar (1992), Sachs and Werner (1995), for empirical  studies  that support the view that open
economies  grow  faster and Rodriguez  and Rodrik  (1999)  for a recent,  more  critical  view of this literature
and its main  conclusion.
3exactly this  transmission occurs  is not yet  fully understood, making  international technology
transfer an active area of research.
Section 2 of the paper discusses dynamic trade models that  shed light on the complex
relationship between technology and trade. These models frequently lead to ambiguous welfare
conclusions.  Much as one may desire, the existing literature (both theoretical and empirical) simply
does not provide a blanket endorsement of trade as an engine for growth. 4 However, it is also not
the case that 'anything can happen'. In fact, the theoretical literature suggests that the scope of
knowledge spillovers is  a  crucial deterninant  of whether or not trade  necessarily encourages
growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). However, empirical  evidence has failed to settle the issue:
some studies discover that knowledge spillovers have a limited geographical scope, whereas others
find the opposite.
Yet, even a definitive measurement of the scope of knowledge spillovers would not settle
the issue, particularly for those interested in the process of international technology  transfer. What
determines  the scope of knowledge spillovers?  This paper argues that a central role must belong to
interaction  between  innovators  (potential  suppliers  of  technology)  and  those  firms  and
entrepreneurs that seek to gain access to newer technologies either through costly imitation or
through technology licensing and other forms of collaboration with innovators. This perspective
implies that a fair bit of technology transfer may indeed  be endogenous.
In his excellent discussion of the special properties of knowledge as an economic good,
Romer (1990) makes the important point that  knowledge is a  non-rival good: it  can be used
simultaneously by  two  different agents. One must be careful however, to not jump  from this
argument to the claim that knowledge can be transferred across agents at  zero cost. If this were
true, the room for policy intervention  with respect to international assimilation of technology would
be severely  limited since any technology  transfer that would yield even a minutely positive return to
any agent would take place automatically. 5 The non-rival nature of knowledge only implies that if
two agents are willing to pay  the cost of adopting a new idea or a technology, they can do  so
4 This is not surprising.  Introducing  dynamics  in an interesting  fashion  often requires  multiple  departures
from the neoclassical  model  of perfect  markets.  Imperfect  competition  and externalities  are central  to the
new dynamic  models  of trade and such distortions  can easily lead to perverse results. Of course,  the
argument cuts both ways. Introducing such elements in  the traditional static model also furnishes
additional  arguments  in support  of free trade. Nevertheless,  the point is that the unconditional  case for
free trade can longer  be made  purely  onr  the basis of logic (see  Krugman, 1987,  for a pragmatic  argument
for free trade  even  in a world  full of market  failures).
S See  Pack (1992)  for an overview  of what can be reasonably  expected  in terms of technology  transfer  to
developing  countries,  given  that the potential  for transfers  is large.
4without interfering with each other's decisions. Much empirical evidence (Teece 1976, Mansfield
and Romeo, 1980, Ramachandran, 1993) indicates that it is indeed costly to transfer technology
internationally.  In his survey of twenty nine technology transfer projects, Teece (1976) found that
on average such costs were approximately twenty percent of the total costs of the project and in
some cases, they were as high as sixty percent.
The fact that  international technology transfer  occurs through a  multitude. of channels
makes it especially difficult to arrive at an aggregate measure of the activity and hence to assess
its contribution to  economic growth in both source and host countries. 6 In  fact, if  one could
somehow rank the different channels of technology transfer in terms of their relative importance,
empirical analysis could then proceed by  ignoring the relatively unimportant of these channels.
However, given that multiple options exist in theory, the dominance  of any one channel in the data
would itself  require explanation. And indeed, the emergence and expansion of multinationals,
given the existence of alternative arrangements for transacting in technology,  has been viewed as a
phenomenon  that requires explanation. This question is addressed in greater detail in section 4.
A major question of interest is that once a technology has been introduced into a country,
does it subsequently diffuse throughout the rest of the economy? The presence of barriers across
countries, as  well  as  intemational differences in  market conditions and  policy  environments
necessarily imply that the technology diffusion within a country may be considerably easier than
international  transfer of technology. For example, mobility of labor is severely constrained only at
the international level (exceptions are contact with consultants, return of foreign educated natives
etc.). Thus, labor turnover across firms may be crucial for driving technology diffusion within a
country and not play as big a role in intemational technology  transfer. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the
role of technology licensing, imitation, and FDI in the process of intemational technology transfer.
Several key questions are addressed: through what channels does imported technology diffuse
within the host country? Do local firms enjoy technology spillovers  from FDI? If so, how are these
realized?
One goal of this paper is to help identify the role policy plays in facilitating intemational
technology transfer. The range of relevant policies is clearly quite large. To limit the scope of the
paper, I only address the role of trade, FDI,  and  IPR policies (section 5).  Given the  central
6 As can be expected  due to the difficult  nature  of the problem,  not much research  has taken this question
head on. Instead,  most research,  both theoretical  as well as empirical,  has tended to focus on one or two
channels  of technology  transfer.  Of these,  trade and FDI have  received  most of the attention.
5questions of interest, the literature on FDI and IPR policy is discussed in greater detail than that on
trade policy. Section 6 presents the main conclusions  of the paper.
2. Knowledge  spillovers  through trade
Much of the relevant literature has emphasized two aspects of the relationship between
trade and technology.  The first of these arises because trade alters the allocation of resources in an
economy  while  the  second  is  related  to  the  role  trade  plays  in  transmitting  knowledge
internationally. In fact, as the literature notes, the implications of these two roles of trade are in
fact quite intertwined.
Since much of the literature emphasizing trade's role in transmitting knowledge derives
from closed economy models of endogenous growth, a  brief digression will help put things  in
context. Traditional growth theory  sought the  explanation of  econonic  growth in  terms  of
accumulation of resources. Capital accumulation was seen as the major determinant of economic
growth and a natural conclusion  of this research was that, unless the return to capital accumulation
could stay bounded away from zero, growth would peter out in the long run. A natural implication
of this finding was that, over time, one should expect poor countries to eventually converge to the
per capita income levels of the rich countries. 7
Standard neoclassical growth models assume costless technology transfer by positing a
common  production function across countries. Note that the fact that chosen production techniques
differ across countries is  not evidence against the neoclassical assumption: when  faced with
different factor prices  (due to  differences in factor  endowments), agents will typically adopt
different techniques in different countries. Thus the real question is whether agents in different
countries can access the global pool of technologies  at the same cost. Parente and Prescott (1994)
have emphasized barriers to technology  adoption as a key determinant of differences in per capita
income across countries. In their model, while any  firm  can  access the  underlying stock of
knowledge in the world economy, the cost of such access may differ across  countries due to
differences in legal, regulatory, political, and  social factors. Thus  the  argument is that  some
countries make it inherently  costlier for their firmns  to adopt modem technologies  and thereby retard
the development  of the entire economy. In fact, Parente and Prescott go on to suggest that trade
may affect growth by lowering  the barriers to technology  adoption.
6In contrast to neoclassical models that stress capital accumulation, the new growth theory
emphasizes endogenous technological change and  the  accumulation of human capital  (Lucas,
1988).8  Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1990), and Anant,
Segerstrom, and Dinopoulos (1991) were among the pioneers of R&D based models of economic
growth. These models were able to provide a coherent framework for the Schumpeterian  notion of
'creative destruction'. While they differ from each other in important ways, one underlying idea
common  to these models is that entrepreneurs conduct R&D to gain temporary monopoly power
where such a privilege is made possible due to the provision  of intellectual  property rights.
Grossman and Helpman (1991) provide a unifying framework for two widely used strands
of R&D based endogenous growth models: the 'varieties only' model that builds on foundations
laid by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Ethier (1982), and Romer (1990), and the 'quality ladders' model
developed by Aghion and Howitt (1990), Segerstrom et. al. (1991) and Grossman and Helpman
(1991). In a closed economy,  growth is sustained in the 'variety model'  through the assumption that
the  creation of new  products  expands  the  knowledge stock,  which  then  lowers the  cost  of
innovation. Thus, as more products are invented, while the profits of subsequent innovators are
lower because of increased competition (no products disappear from the market in this model), so
are the costs of inventing  new products. In the quality ladders model, since consumers are willing
to pay a  premium for  higher quality products, firms always have an incentive to  improve the
quality of products. The important assumption that sustains growth in this model is that  every
successful innovation allows all firms to study the attributes of the product and then improve upon
it. Patent rights restrict a firm from producing a product invented  by some other firm but not from
using the knowledge (created due to R&D) that is embodied in that product. Thus, as soon as a
product  is  created, knowledge needed for  its  production becomes available  to  all  and  such
knowledge spillovers ensure that anyone can try to invent a  higher quality version of the same
product.
While R&D based endogenous growth theory is quite appealing theoretically, empirical
evidence does not provide a strong endorsement (Pack, 1992). In fact, Jones (1995a, and 1995b)
has explicitly tested the empirical implications of R&D based models of economic growth and
found  that  the  data  reject  these implications. One  should be  careful,  however. Rejecting a
7 The evidence  on convergence  is weak; while some countries  such as South  Korea, Taiwan,  and Hong
Kong did achieve  enviable  rates of growth,  most developing  countries  do not seem to be on any path of
convergence  toward  rich countries  (Pritchett,  1997).
7particular model of R&D based economic growth does not imply that R&D is not an important
determinant of growth. In fact, a reasonable conclusion may be that while R&D is crucial for the
generation of new ideas and hence economic growth, early variants of the R&D based growth
models do not adequately capture the relationship between R&D and growth. In fact, the newer
strand of growth theory has not abandoned R&D  as a  determinant of growth; instead, it has
focused on creating models that do not have the 'scale  effects' that  Jones demonstrated as not
supported by the data. 9
If, as R&D based models of growth argue, new products result from new ideas, trade in
goods can help transmit knowledge internationally. This  is the  central  insight of many open
economy growth models that explore the relationship between trade  and growth. There are two
strands of multi-country models of endogenous  growth: those that  study trade between identical
countries and those that have a North-South structure. While knowledge spillovers are central to
both, technology  transfer in the sense emphasized in this paper is a central feature only of North-
South models. Some of the prominent early works are Krugman (1979), Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991), and Grossman and Helpman (1991). The literature is now rather large and a full discussion
requires a survey of its own (see Grossman and Helpman, 1995). Yet, North-South models that
emphasize the  product  cycle nature  of trade  have been particularly  useful  for  understanding
international  technology  transfer and merit some further discussion.
T'he basic idea of product cycle models (for details see Grossman and Helpman, 1991) is
that new products are invented in the North and due to lower relative Southern wage (endogenous
in the model) firms in the South can successfully  undercut Northern producers once they succeed in
imitating Northern products. A typical good is initially produced in the North till either further
innovation (in the quality ladders model) or successful Southern imitation (in both the variety
model  and  the  quality  ladders  model) makes profitable  production  in  the  North  infeasible.
Consequently, either production ceases all together (if product is innovated over) or shifts to the
South (if imitated). Thus, prior to imitation, all products are exported by the North whereas post
imitation  they are imported,  thereby completing  the cycle. These models capture technology driven
trade and have been generalized  to consider technology transfer more explicitly. Its clear from the
8 For our purposes,  the literature  on R&D  based growth models  is clearly  more relevant and we restrict
attention  to this strand  of growth  theory.
9Roughly  speaking,  scale  effects  imply  that large  economies  grow  faster  than small economies.  See
Dinopoulos  and Thompson  (1999)  for a lucid  discussion  of scale  effects  in endogenous  growth  models.
8preceding discussion, for  example, that  FDI  or licensing (choices available to innovators for
producing  in the South) were not considered  in the early variants of these models.
What do R&D based models of growth imply about the effect of trade  on growth? The
central conclusion of this line of research literature is that much of importance hinges on whether
knowledge spillovers are national or international in nature (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). It
turns  out that  most  perverse possibilities usually  arise  for  the  case  of  national  knowledge
spillovers.'° If not, by  and large, the literature endorses the common assertion that  trade is an
engine of growth." Note that this perspective is more relevant for North-North models of trade
since international knowledge spillovers (of one form or another) are assumed  in North-South
models of trade, where the South is modeled  as a pure imitator.'2
Two questions  are of immediate  interest. First, what does empirical evidence say about the
scope  of  knowledge spillovers? Second, should research focus  primarily  on  determining the
geographical scope of spillovers? As can be expected, there exists no simple answer to the first
question. The frequently witnessed agglomeration of R&D intensive industries (such as in Silicon
Valley) suggests that spillovers may be primarily local. On the other hand, several studies find that
R&D activity in a country is not strongly correlated with its own productivity growth, suggesting
that  results of R&D  in one country may spill over substantially to  other countries. Eaton and
Kortum (1996) find that more than  50% of the growth in some OECD countries derives from
innovation in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Yet they also report that distance inhibits the
flow of ideas between countries whereas trade enhances it. In their micro-level study of the semi-
conductor industry, Irwin and Klenow (1994) find that learning (resulting from production) spills
over as much across national borders as it does between firms in the same country. Similarly, Coe
and Helpman (1995) and Coe et. al. (1997) argue that international  R&D spillovers are substantial
10 It is easy  to see that if such dynamic  externalities  are national in scope, trade can induce perverse
outcomes  by altering  the allocation  of resources  in a country.
11  The debate  among  economists  about  what factors  can help account  for the explosive  growth  of countries
like  Hong Kong, South  Korea,  and Taiwan  also deserves  mention  here. While some argue that economic
growth in these  countries  was a driven largely  by accumulation  of resources  (Young 1995),  others  argue
that it is improvement  in productivity  (driven  partly through  trade) that played a large role (see  Nelson
and Pack, forthcoming,  for a clear lucid discussion).  Nevertheless,  even if capital accumulation  was the
driving  force,  it is not clear why capital  accumulation  took  place at such a high rate: what kept the returns
to capital accumulation  so high? One possibility  is that technology  transfer (again  partly through trade)
kept the marginal product  of capital from falling and kept investment  rates high (Nelson and Pack,
forthcoming).
12 In North-South  niodels,  the more  interesting  question  is how Southern  imitation  affects incentives  for
innovation  in the North.
9and that trade is an important channel of such spillovers." 3 However, Keller (1998) casts doubt on
the latter assertion by generating results similar to those of Coe and Helpman (1995) for randomly
generated trade weights. 14 So what is one to make of all this conflicting evidence? As Grossman
and Helpman (1995) note, the truth is quite likely that knowledge spillovers are neither exclusively
national nor international; they are probably both to some extent." 5 Second, as noted earlier, one
needs to dig deeper into the issue: focusing primarily on the geographical scope of spillovers may
result in glossing over what really is the heart of the matter after all.
In most theoretical models,  knowledge spillovers across countries are either assumed to be
national or international in scope and then the predictions of the two scenarios are contrasted.
Following this  line of argument, the goal  of the empirical economist simply becomes one of
determining which  assumption  is  indeed  appropriate.  Yet,  such  an  approach  sits  rather
uncomfortably  with the central tenets of the literature on trade and growth. A major theme of this
literature is that technological change occurs due to intentional and costly investments undertaken
by  firms and entrepreneurs seeking to  profit from monopoly power resulting from successful
innovation.  If so, arbitrage in knowledge, which is basically what the spread of know-how across
countries amounts to, cannot be totally exogenous to economic activity either. The sane  set of
agents that invest heavily in creating new technologies face strong incentives to control the spread
of their hard earned successes. If such control were not possible, they would have little incentive  to
make those investments  in the first place. Thus, if inventors do play a role in controlling  the rate at
which their technologies spread internationally, and for the theory of trade and innovation to be
13 Using data for 87 countries,  Hakura  and Jaumotte  (1999)  find that trade indeed  serves  as a channel  of
international  technology  transfer  to developing  countries  and that inter-industry  trade plays  a stronger  role
in technology  transfer  than intra-industry  trade. Since  intra-industry  trade is more  pervasive  among
developed  countries  than it is between  developed  and developing  countries,  an inunediate  implication  of
their findings  is that developing  countries  will enjoy  relatively  less  technology  transfer  from trade than
developed  countries.
14  In a response  to Keller (1998),  Coe  and Hoffmaister  (1999)  raise some doubts  about Keller's  findings.
They  argue that  Keller's  'random' weights  are not actually  random  and when  alternative  weights  are used,
estimated  international  R&D spillovers  are non-existent  for the case of random weights,  as suggested  by
theory. Using estimates  of international  R&D spillovers  from Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et. al.
(1997), Bayoumi,  et. al. (1999) simulate  the impact of changes  in R&D and in exposure  to trade on
productivity,  capital,  output  and consumption  in a multi-country  model  (IMF's MULTIMOD  econometric
model).  Their simulations  indicate  that R&D can affect output not only directly  but also indirectly  by
stimulating  capital investment.  Incidentally,  this finding is also of interest for the debate regarding  the
Asian  growth  miracle.
IS Evidence  on this issue continues  to come  in. In a recent  paper, using firm level data from the U.S.  and
Japan, Branstetter (1996) comes out strongly in favor of the limited (national) scope of knowledge
spillovers.
10internally consistent this is almost a requirement, then it is misleading to focus primarily on the
geographical  scope of spillovers  without giving innovators some role in that process.
Of  course, the  incentives of innovators are not the  only deterninant  of the  scope of
knowledge spillovers. One most also consider the incentives facing potential buyers and imitators
of technologies. As we will see, by and large, the existing literature in this area has not paid
adequate attention to the rich choice set faced by both potential suppliers and buyers of technology.
We next discuss the literature that seeks to  explain the emergence of multinational firms, since
such firms play a central role in international  technology  transfer.
3. Explaining FDI: Location and Mode of Production
There are two distinct questions that a firm seeking  to serve foreign markets must contend
with. First is the issue of location of production: is it better to produce the good in the home
country and export to foreign markets(s) or is production abroad more profitable? Second, if
production is to be located abroad, how should technology be transferred overseas? Firms can
choose from a variety of arrangements  that differ in their relative use of markets and organizations.
At the one extreme lie technology transfers to wholly owned subsidiaries while at  the other lie
transfers to unrelated parties via technology licensing.  We address each of these questions in turn.
3.1. Exports  versus Production  Abroad
As noted above, when serving a foreign  market, a firm can choose from a menu of options.
In  this  context, the  choice between exports and  FDI  has  received the  most  attention in the
economics  literature. Note, first that, this question assumes that exports and direct investment are
substitutes for  one another.  Is  this  widely used  assumption justified?  A  first  reading of the
empirical literature on the question suggests not. Most existing empirical work usually uncovers a
complementary  relationship between exports and foreign affiliate sales. Lipsey and Weiss (1981)
is a prominent example of such research. They find that affiliate sales are positively correlated with
exports at the industry level. Firm level studies such as Lipsey and Weiss (1984), Graham and
Mutti (1991), and Blomstrom et. al. (1993) also uncover a complementary relationship between
trade and FDI.
Does the  evidence imply that  most theoretical models are  flawed?" 6 Perhaps  not.  A
reasonable interpretation of the existing evidence, as suggested by Blonigen (1999), is simply that
16  Of course,  it is easy to construct theoretical models in which exports and sales of affiliates  are
complementary.  Introducing  a vertical  structure  in production  obviously  accomplishes  the task; thus most
11such studies are finding net complemenatrity: aggregation bias  in the data  simply buries  the
substitution effects emphasized in theoretical models. The major contribution of Blonigen (1999)
lies in using product level data since it as at this level that the substitution effect is really implied
by theory. He uses data on Japanese production and exports to the US for two types of products:
automobile parts and automobiles." Only a study of this type can really be expected to sort out the
complementary  nature of trade between intermediate  goods and affiliate sales on the one hand and
the substitutability of exports of final goods and FDI on the other. Not surprisingly, Blonigen's
(1999) results conform nicely to the theory: exports of intermediate  goods and sales of affiliates are
complements  whereas exports and sales of final goods are substitutes. The only unresolved issue is
why aggregate studies continue to find a net complementary relationship.'" The explanation here
probably comes from a fact noted much earlier in the literature by trade theorists and especially
emphasized by Ethier (1982): most trade between industrialized countries involves exchange of
intermediate goods." 9 Thus,  if  such trade  is  indeed pervasive,  one  should expect  a  strong
complementary  relationship between  exports and FDI at the aggregate level.
Existing theoretical models have also explored strategic considerations that influence the
choice between  exports and FDI (see Horstmann and Markusen, 1992, Norman and Motta, 1993,
and Motta and Norman, 1996). As is clear, the presence of trade barriers creates a tariff-jumping
motive for FDI.20 However, the  preceding research highlights the  interdependence of decision
making between multinational firms. For example, when two firms are exporting to  a  foreign
market, a switch from exports to FDI by one creates an incentive for FDI on the other firn's  part,
who finds itself at  a  competitive disadvantage (Lin  and Saggi,  1999, call this the  competitive
incentive for FDI). 2"
types  of outsourcing  which  involves  basic stages  of production  being carried  out in one location  and other
stages such as R&D  and/or marketing  being done elsewhere  would  imply a complementary  relationship
between  exports  and  FDI.
11  Such  a study  is particularly  useful  in the context  of Japanese  firms who  import relatively  large amounts
of parts from Japan and seem  quite  unwilling  to substitute  between  US and Japanese  parts.
1' Another  issue that complicates  the story is endogenity  of demand.  Some  authors have argued  that the
location of production  may itself alter the demand  function  facing the foreign firm's product  because
consumers  may expect  better after sales service  or commitment  to the local market  if the foreign  firm
produced  the good  localy.
'9 The literature  on intraindustry  trade as derived  from Dixit-Stiglitz's  (1977) model  may over-emphasize
the role  of product  differentiation  and consumer  emphasis  on variety.  As Ethier (1982)  noted,  actual  trade
is in intermediate  goods  needed  for production.
20 Bhagwati  et. al. (1987  andl992) have  even argued  that the mere  threat of future trade restrictions  may
lead to anticipatory  investment  (termed  'quid pro quo'  investment)  by foreign  firms.
21  An old tradition in the management  literature describes  the interdependence  between  the decision
making  of large  multinationals  as 'follow  the leader' behavior.
12As far as the static choice between exports and production abroad is concerned, existing
theoretical models seem reasonably well developed. However, this is a limited perspective: firms
face a dynamic problem and not a one-time choice between exports and  FDI. They may, and
indeed do, switch between the two activities over time. Unfortunately, the literature exploring the
dynamics of optimal entry strategies into foreign markets is scarce. A recent study by Roberts and
Tybout (1997), while not exploring the choice between different entry strategies does highlight  the
role of sunk costs in determining the dynamic behavior of exporters. Using data for Colombian
manufacturing plants, Roberts and Tybout  (1997) show that prior  exporting experience is  an
important determinant of current tendency to export as well as profitability of exporting. Their
findings show that sunk costs are indeed relevant for exporting behavior and that learning is subject
to strong depreciation: the entry costs of a plant that has never exported do not differ significantly
from plants that have not exported  for more than two years.
While Roberts and Tybout (1997) do not consider other modes of serving foreign markets,
their insight can be utilized in a more general context. Suppose firms also have the option of FDI.
Building  on their approach, one can view the choice between  exports and FDI as a choice between
two different technologies, where exports entail a higher marginal cost and a lower fixed (sunk)
cost than FDI. Under uncertainty, if firms do face such a cost structure, an interesting dynamic
relationship between exports and FDI may emerge. Saggi (1997) builds a two-period model to
examine a firm's choice between exports and FDI in the face of demand uncertainty. First period
exports yield information about demand  in the foreign  market. As a result, first period exports have
an option value: if a significant portion of the fixed cost of FDI is sunk, it is optimal for a firm to
export in the first period and do FDI iff demand abroad is large enough. Clearly, the preceding
argument is not specific to demand uncertainty and can be generalized with respect to other types
of uncertainty about which sales via exports can yield information. 22 Of course, generalizing the
preceding argument to  the case  of multiple firms also  creates the possibility of informational
externalities amongst investors: experience of  one  firm  may  impart  lessons to  others.  Such
externalities may be particularly relevant for FDI into many developing and formerly communist
countries (China and  much of  Eastern Europe) that  have  recently altered their policies in  a
22  Similarly,  exports  and initial FDI may be strongly  complementary  for another reason: firms are not
likely  to shift  the entire  production  process  to a new location  immediately.  If initial investment  is found  to
be profitable, local sourcing may reduce the  need for  importing intermediates. Over time, such
substitution  effects  may  become  stronger  and the complementarity  between  exports  and FDI may become
weaker (assuming local suppliers are  indeed competitive or  local production is  consistent with
comparative  advantage  considerations).
13remarkable manner. As a result, firms from industrialized countries have gained access to hitherto
closed markets and to many cheap locations of production for the first time. But at the same time,
they have little prior experience in operating in these new environments. This lack of experience
coupled with the complexity surrounding the FDI decision implies that firms seeking to invest in
these markets can learn valuable lessons from the successes and failures of others. 23 In their survey
of  Japanese firms  planning  investments in  Asia,  Kinoshita  and  Mody  (1997)  found  that
information,  both private and public, plays an important role in deternining investment decisions.
They argue that information regarding many operational conditions (such as functioning of labor
markets, literacy and productivity of the labor force, timely availability as well as quality of inputs
etc.) may not be available publicly. In such a scenario, information  is either gathered through one's
own direct experience or through the experience  of others. Thus, present investment is a function of
one's own investment  as well as those of rival investors. Their empirical analysis finds that a firm's
current investment  is strongly affected by its own past behavior as well as investments  by its rivals.
While the degree of fixed/sunk costs may play a  role in determining the choice between
licensing, joint  ventures, and  FDI, other considerations are probably more important. A  new
foreign plant is the primary contributing factor behind higher fixed/sunk costs of FDI relative to
exports, and this factor is unlikely to be of first order importance  in determining  the choice between
different entry modes that are distinguished  primarily by the extent of ownership.
3.2. Mode of Operation: Licensing, Joint  Venture or FDI?
A major question in the theory of the multinational firm is when and why firms choose to
internalize technology transfer thereby foregoing the option of utilizing market based alternatives
such as technology licensing. The relevant economics literature regarding internalization  has been
discussed extensively in Markusen (1995) and Caves (1996).24  Here, we restrict attention to the
central conclusions of this line of research, particularly those that relate to technology  transfer.
23 FDI involves  hiring foreign  labor, setting  up a new plant, meeting  foreign  regulations,  developing  new
marketing  plans, decisions  that can me made  properly only  with adequate  information.  In this context,
decisions  made  by rival firms can lower a firm's fixed cost  by helping avoid  mistakes.  See  Lin and Saggi
(1999) for a duopoly  model  in which the firm first to switch  to FDI from exporting  confers a positive
externality  on the subsequent  investor  by lowering  its fixed  cost  of FDI.
24  There exists a vast literature in the field of international  business  that deals with some of the very
questions  posed above. By and large, this literature involves empirical  tests of the OLI (ownership,
location,  and internalization)  paradigm  formulated  by John Dunning. To limit scope, this literature is
discussed  only  to the extent that it offers  new insights with respect to the economics  of multinational
firms. See  Caves  (1996)  for a relatively  recent  survey  of this literature.
14Recently, Markusen and Maskus (1999) have suggested that the literature that attempts to
link the emergence of multinational firms with firm  and country  level characteristics can be
understood to  emerge from a  common underlying model - the 'knowledge-capital' model. 25 As
Markusen (1998) argues, this model rests on the fact that knowledge capital has a public good
property: it can be utilized in multiple locations simultaneously. Thus, any innovation can then be
fruitfully  applied at  multiple  plants  dispersed all  over  the  world,  giving  rise  to  horizontal
multinational firms. Markusen  and Maskus (1999) show that  there  is indeed strong empirical
support for this horizontal  model of multinationals.
How does the knowledge-capital  model explain internalization? Once again the public good
nature of knowledge occupies a central role. If licensees (or local partners under a joint venture)
can get access to the multinational's proprietary knowledge, the value of such knowledge can be
dissipated either because of increased competition (Ethier and Markusen, 1991, Markusen, 1999,
and Saggi, 1996 and  1999) or because the local partner has inadequate incentives to protect the
multinational's  reputation  (Horstmann and  Markusen,  1987).  The  incentive to  prevent  the
dissipation  of  knowledge based  assets  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  multinationals  transfer
technologies of new vintage via direct  investment, preferring to  license or transfer their older
technologies  via joint ventures (see Mansfield  and Romeo, 1980).26
In recent empirical paper, Smarzynska (1999a) focuses on intra-industry differences in
R&D intensity as a determinant of mode of entry chosen by firms investing in eastern European
countries. Like past work, this study finds that a firm's R&D expenditure is negatively related to
the probability of a joint venture and positively related to greenfield entry. Furthermore, a  firm's
R&D expenditure relative to the rest of the industry is positively correlated with the probability of
greenfield  entry in high technology sectors. More interestingly,  however, in low technology sectors,
higher relative R&D expenditure by  a  firm actually increases the likelihood of a joint venture
rather than a greenfield  entry. Thus, a firm's R&D expenditure  relative to others in an industry and
the aggregate R&D expenditure of the industry relative to other industries may both interact in
subtle ways to influence the choice between alternative entry modes. Smarzysnka (1999a) argues
that  protecting one's  technology is  of greater concern in  high technology industries, thereby
encouraging technological leaders to  adopt  direct entry. However, it  is  also  possible that  in
25 Papers  that deal directly  with technology  transfer  are: Horstmann  and Markusen  (1987 and 1996),  and
Ethier and Markusen  (1991).  See  also  Markusen  (1998)  for a good  overview.
26  Of course, it may be easier to trade via the market when technology  is older since asymmetric
information  problems  are likely  to be less severe.
15industries characterized by a fast pace of technological change, any technology leakage will hurt a
firm for only a short period of time. 27 Furthermore, the formation of joint ventures will be easier in
relatively mature host industries since suitable local partners can be found more easily. Thus, her
results call for a careful interpretation but raise some interesting  possibilities and further questions.
Foreign firms may  not be the only one's that  have valuable information that may  be
subject to dissipation due to diffusion  to other firms. Horstmann and Markusen (1996) argue that a
potential licensee in the host country may have better information about local demand and can use
this information  to extract rents from the licenser. Such agency costs can also be utilized to explain
the dynamics of optimal entry modes. In his studies of British multinationals, Nicholas (1982 and
1983) found that eighty eight percent initially sold their products via a contract with a local agent
before converting to directly owned sales or production branches. Furthermore, the decision to
terminate the licensing arrangement was based on a  desire to avoid agency costs, and once the
multinational had  acquired the information it needed via  its  alliance with  the  local  partner,
continuing the agency relationship was no longer attractive. Similarly, in their survey of Japanese
multinationals in Australia, Nicholas et. al.  (1994) found that sixty percent used a local agent
before making a direct investment and sixty nine percent exported to Australia before making a
direct investment of any sort. One can view such temporary licensing as a method of information
acquisition on the part of the foreign firm, as opposed to the local firm seeking  superior production
technology.
In Horstmann and Markusen's (1996) model, when the multinational firm's fixed cost of
investment are high relative to the agent's and there is risk of large losses due to low demand, the
multinational  opts for an initial licensing contract that becomes permanent ex post in case of low
demand. Their analysis can be applied to examine the choice between a joint venture and a wholly
owned subsidiary, except that cost uncertainty may be more relevant for this scenario than demand
uncertainty. For example, if the productivity of foreign labor is in doubt, forming a joint venture
may present a low (fixed) cost option. If labor productivity turns out to be high, an acquisition of
the foreign partner may be optimal ex post, resulting in the establishment of a wholly owned
subsidiary.
27  Theory does not provide  a clear support for her terminology  (those doing more R&D are deemed
technological  leaders).  Firms that have been driven out of the market  may have a stronger incentive  to
invest  in R&D  than present  technological  leaders.  In the real world,  a measure  of cumulative  R&D  over  a
time  period  may serve  as a better index  of technological  superiority.
16By and large, however, dynamic issues remain under explored in the literature. While the
comparative statics  of existing models help gain  some partial intuition about forces that  are
important for dynamic choice, such an approach is a poor substitute for explicit dynamic  modeling.
Several central  questions remain under explored: What  determnines  the  sequencing pattern  of
different activities? For example, do firms first form joint ventures and then proceed with foreign
direct investment? If so, why is this so? To what extent do the dynamic choices of foreign firms
result from their  efforts to  restrict diffusion of their own technology while at  the  same time
maximizing the acquisition of valuable information possessed by  local firms? Do host country
welfare and the rate of technology diffusion depend upon the sequencing pattern? We take up the
last question in section 6.
4. Foreign direct investment: technology transfer and spillovers
While  convincing evidence of  the  dominance of  FDI  as  a  channel  of  international
technology transfer (among those channels that directly involve the owner of the technology being
transferred) is hard to find, several facts hint in that direction. For example, in 1995, over eighty
percent of  global royalty payments for  international transfer  of  technology were made  from
subsidiaries to their parent firms (UNCTAD, 1997). However, these payments only record the
explicit sale of technology  and give us no clue about the importance  of technology transfer via FDI
relative to technology transfer via imitation, trade in goods etc. Nevertheless, what makes FDI
especially  important is that unlike trade in goods, where developing  countries try to glean whatever
information  they can from the products and services imported or import capital goods that embody
modern  technology, FDI involves explicit trade in technology. One may expect FDI to have a first
order effect on technology transfer, just  as other arms length transactions such as licensing and
other turnkey projects.
Yet  another  confirmation of  the  strong  role  FDI  plays  in  transmitting technology
internationally comes  from  the  inter-industry  distribution  of  FDI.  It  is  well  known  that
multinational firms are concentrated in industries  that exhibit a high ratio of R&D relative to sales
and a large share of technical and professional workers (Markusen, 1995). In fact, it is commonly
argued that,  multinationals rely heavily on  intangible assets  such as  superior  technology to
successfully  compete with local firms who are better acquainted  with the host country environment.
By encouraging FDI, developing countries hope not only to import more efficient foreign
technologies but also to generate technological spillovers for local firms. Not surprisingly, there
17exists a large literature that tries to determine whether or not host countries enjoy spillovers from
FDI. One needs to  be clear about the meaning of word 'spillover': a  distinction can be made
between pecuniary externalities (that result from the effects of FDI on market structure) and other
pure externalities (such as the facilitation of technology adoption) that may accompany FDI. A
strict definition  of spillovers would only count the latter and this is the definition employed in this
paper. 28
The central difficulty is that spillovers,  as defined  above, will not leave a paper trail -- they
are  externalities that the market fails to  take into account. Nevertheless, several studies have
attempted the difficult task  of quantifying spillovers and we  discuss them below. But  a  prior
question is what are the potential channels  through which such spillovers  may arise? 29 At a general
level, the literature suggests the following  potential channels of spillovers:
Demonstration  effects: local firms may adopt technologies introduced by multinational
firms through imitation  or reverse engineering.
Labor turnover:  workers trained or previously employed  by the multinational  may transfer
important information to  local firms by switching employers or may  contribute to technology
diffusion by starting their own firms.
Vertical linkages: multinationals may  transfer  technology to  firms that  are potential
suppliers of intermediate  goods or buyers of their own products.
Let  us  examine each of these  channels in  some detail, discussing empirical evidence
wherever it exists.
4.1. Facilitation of technology adoption
In its simplest form, the demonstration  effect argument states that exposure to the superior
technology of multinational firms may lead local firms to update their own production methods.
The main point here is that in the absence of FDI, it may simply be too costly for local firms to
acquire the necessary information for adopting new technologies  if they are not first introduced in
28 In other  words,  if FDI spurs innovation  in the domestic  industry  by increasing  competition,  we do not
view that as a 'spillover'  from FDI but rather a benefit  enjoyed  by the host country  that works its way
through the price mechanism  and the market  equilibrium.  Of course,  it is very difficult  to empirically
isolate  the pure  externalities  from FDI from its other effects  that work  through the market.  Furthennore,
policy  ought to be based on the aggregate  effect of FDI on welfare,  not just on the extent of positive
externalities  from  FDI.
29  In fact, a more  difficult  question  can be asked: is it reasonable  to even  expect spillovers  to occur from
FDI?  It seems  natural  to assume  that multinationals  have  much to gain from preventing  the spread  of their
technologies  to potential rivals. A possible exception  to this argument  arises when technologies  may
diffuse  to-potential  suppliers  of inputs  or buyers  of goods  and services  sold  by multinationals.
18the local economy  by multinationals (and hence demonstrated  to succeed in the local environment).
Incidentally, the demonstration effect argument relates well to  the point made  by Parente  and
Prescott  (1994)  that  trade  may  lower  costs  of  technology adoption. Clearly,  geographical
proximity is a vital part of the demonstration effect argument. As noted earlier, empirical evidence
on the geographical scope of R&D  spillovers is mixed. However, studies that  reach optimistic
conclusions  with respect to the international  nature of R&D spillovers typically involve data from
industrialized  countries and therefore require qualification. Geographical proximity may indeed be
crucial for developing countries that are not as well integrated into the world economy and may
have few alternative channels of absorbing technologies,  at least over a reasonable time horizon.
The main insight of the demonstration effect argument is that FDI may expand the set of
technologies available to local firms. If so, this  is a  potential positive externality. One must be
careful, however since a mere expansion in choices need not imply faster technology adoption,
especially if incentives  for adoption are also altered due to the impact of FDI on domestic market
structure. FDI may expand choices but it generally also increases competition. 30 The net effect on
the incentives  for adopting  new technologies  may indeed be ambiguous.
Suppose FDI does lower the cost of technology adoption and leads to faster adoption of
new technologies by  local firms. Does that imply that, relative to trade (i.e. a  scenario where
foreign firm(s)  export to  the  domestic or  world  market),  inward  FDI  necessarily generates
spillovers for the local economy?  A point to keep in mind is that foreign firms will face more severe
competition as a  result of  faster technology diffusion. Foreseeing the  consequences of faster
diffusion, foreign firms may alter the very terms of their original technology  transfer. For example,
a foreign firm may choose to transfer technologies of lower quality when there is a risk of leakage
or adoption of the technology by local firms. It is conceivable,  however,  that due to their larger size
and other advantages  they enjoy in the product market, multinationals can alter the market outcome
in their favor despite technology leakage and do not have to resort to such strategies. For example,
Das  (1987)  presents  a  model in  which  native  firms  may  learn  from  the  subsidiary  of  a
multinational firm who acts as a dominant firm facing a local competitive fringe in the product
30  The industrial organization literature on market structure and  innovation does not provide an
unambiguous  answer to this question either. A rough conclusion  is that a monopolist  has a  stronger
incentive to  invest in  R&D that yields innovations that  complement existing technology  whereas
competitive  firms have a stronger incentive  to invest in R&D that results in innovations  that replace
existing  technology.
19market. 3"  Assuming the rate of increase in efficiency of the local firms to be positively related to
the scale of operation of the multinational firm's subsidiary, Das (1987) investigates the optimal
time paths of the multinational's output and price. She shows that despite technology leakage, the
multinational  may find it profitable to transfer technology. 32
Since the demonstration effect argument is largely an industry-level argument, relating
industry level variation in R&D expenditures by local firms to the extent of FDI is one method of
checking  whether local adoption efforts are encouraged  via FDI. Of course, such an exercise would
have to control for the effect of FDI on market structure and this seems rather difficuk. To the best
of my knowledge,  a convincing empirical  exercise of this type has not been performed. Instead, the
existing literature has focused on the effects of FDI on total factor productivity in local firms. We
turn to this next.
4.2. Empirical evidence on spillovers
Early  efforts in search of spillovers from FDI proceeded by relating the  inter-industry
variation in  productivity to the  extent of  FDI.  Examples of this  research  are  Caves  (1974),
Globerman (1979), Blomstrom and Hakan (1983), and  Blomstrom (1986). By and large, these
studies find that sectors with higher level of foreign involvement (as measured by  share or labor
force in the industry employed by foreign firms or the extent of foreign ownership), tend to have
higher productivity, or higher productivity growt,  or both. The fact that these studies involved
data from different countries (Australia for the Caves study, Canada for Globerman, and Mexico
for Blomstrom) lends a strong degree of robustness to this positive correlation between the level of
foreign involvement  and productivity in a sector. Of course, the trouble is that correlation is not
causation and as noted by Aitken and Harrison (1999), this literature may have overstated the
positive impact of FDI on productivity in the host country. Investment may have been attracted to
the more productive sectors of the economy instead of being the cause of the high productivity in
such sectors. In other words, past studies may have ignored an important self-selection  problem.
31  A  related model is presented in  Wang and Blomstrom (1992). In  their duopoly model with
differentiated  goods,  a multinational  transfers technology  to its subsidiary  given that the local firm can
learn from the new technologies  introduced.  Learning occurs  both through costless  technology  spillovers
(as in the contagion  effects  first emphasized  by Findlay, 1978)  as well as through costly  investments  made
by the local firm. The most interesting  implication  of the model is that technology  transfer  via FDI is
positively related to  the level of the local firm's learning investment. This  result suggests that
multinationals  respond  to local competition  by introducing  newer  technologies  faster.
32  Huizinga (1994) models a multinational's  incentive for technology  transfer where it faces risk of
competition  caused by expropriation  by the host country government.  The main result is that the
20Both trade  and  FDI,  help  ensure an  efficient allocation of  global  resources by  encouraging
investment in those sectors in which an economy enjoys comparative advantage. In this sense, the
point noted by  Aitken and Harrison (1999) is  almost necessarily implied by  traditional trade
theory, unless trade protection encourages investment in sectors in which a host economy does not
enjoy comparative advantage, in which case it may very well be welfare reducing.
Nevertheless, only with plant level studies can one control for the self-selection  problem
that might plague previous industry level studies. However, even this does not settle the issue. A
self-selection  problem may also plague plant level studies: the more productive plants may be the
one's that attract foreign investment. 33 Nevertheless,  if plant level studies  fail  to find a significant
relationship between foreign involvement and productivity, the self-selection problem cannot be
important, unless  the argument is that foreign firms seek out plants with low productivity and then
bring them up to  par  with other, more efficient local firms so that  in the end, no  significant
productivity differential between foreign and local firms is found! This argument may be far-
fetched but could make sense as follows. Suppose local plants with very low productivity are
relatively under-valued by  local agents since the skills (technology, modem  management etc.)
needed to bring them up to speed are in short supply locally. In such a scenario, such plants would
be attractive to foreign investors who may be able to  generate productivity improvements that
simply cannot be achieved by local agents.
What do empirical plant level studies find with respect to spillovers from FDI? The first
study to employ a comprehensive  data set at the level of the individual firm over several years was
Haddad  and  Harrison  (1993).  The data  for  this  study  came from  an  annual  survey of  all
manufacturing firms in Morocco. The most fundamental result of this study was that foreign firms
exhibit higher levels of total factor productivity (TFP) but their rate of TFP growth was lower than
domestic firms. As the authors note, at first glance, such a finding suggests that perhaps there was
some sort of convergence  between domestic and foreign firms. However, this  was not the case.
While there was a level effect of foreign investment on the TFP of domestic firms, such an effect
was missing for the growth rate of TFP of domestic firms. Secondly, when sectors were divided
into high and low tech, the effect of FDI at the sectoral level was found to be more positive in low-
tech sectors. The authors interpret this result as indicative of the lack of absorptive capacity on the
multinational  responds  to this risk  by lowering  the quality  of technology  transfer  even  when such transfers
are costless.
33 A recent  paper by Clerides  et. al. (1999)  finds support  in favor of the self selection  hypothesis  in the
context  of exporting:  it is the more  productive  firms that self select  into exporting.
21part of local firms in the high-tech sector, where they may be further behind multinationals and
unable to absorb foreign  technology.
Another attempt to measure spillovers from FDI was undertaken by Aitken, Harrison, and
Lipsey (1996). This study approached the issue of technology spillovers from FDI through the
labor market. The idea was that technology spillovers should increase the marginal product of
labor and this should show up in the wages for workers. The study employed data collected from
surveys of manufacturing firms in Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States. For both Mexico and
Venezuela, a higher share of foreign employment  was associated with higher overall wages for both
skilled and unskilled workers. Furthermore, royalty payments were also highly correlated with
wages. Most importantly, there was no positive impact of FDI on wages of workers employed by
domestic firms. In fact, the authors report a small a negative effect and finally, the overall effect
(for the entire industry) was positive. These findings are to be contrasted with those for the United
States, where a larger share of foreign firms in employment was associated with both a higher
average wage as well as higher wages in domestic establishments.
When the findings of the second study are put into the context of previous work, it is clear
that wage spillovers (from foreign to domestic firms) are associated with higher productivity in
domestic plants. Conversely, absence of wage spillovers appears to accompany the existence of
productivity differentials between domestic and foreign firms. Why might this be so? Any serious
explanation of this association requires that the one must study the interaction of the market for
labor and goods. Glass and Saggi (1999) develop a model to  capture this interaction and their
findings are discussed in the sub-section  on labor turnover below.
The most recent study on the issue of spillovers from FDI is Aitken and Harrison (1999).
This study uses annual census data on over 4000 Venezuelan  firns.  Since each plant was observed
over a period of time, the self-selection  problem inflicting past sectoral level studies (i.e. FDI goes
to the  more productive sectors) could be  avoided. The  authors found a  positive relationship
between  foreign equity participation and plant performance implying  that foreign participation does
indeed benefit plants that receive such participation. However, this own plant effect was robust for
only small plants i.e. those plants that employed less than 50 employees.  For larger plants, foreign
participation resulted in no significant improvement in productivity relative to domestic plants.
More interestingly,  productivity in domestic plants declined when foreign investment increased. In
other words, they found evidence of negative spillovers from FDI and suggested that such negative
spillovers could result from a market stealing effect: foreign competition  may have forced domestic
22firms to lower output and thereby forgo economies of scale. Note that if loss in output is large
enough, local plants may  have  lower productivity despite enjoying some sort  of technology
spillovers.  Nevertheless,  on balance, the authors found that the effect of FDI on the productivity of
the entire industry was weakly positive. They also noted in a  footnote that  similar results were
obtained for  Indonesia except that the positive effect on own plants was stronger whereas the
negative effect on domestic plants was weaker, suggesting a  stronger overall positive effect for
Indonesia's  case.
In a recent paper, Djankov and Hoekman (1999) also found a negative spillover effect of
FDI on purely domestic firms in Czech industry. Interestingly, however, when joint ventures were
excluded from the sample and attention was restricted to the impact of majority-owned foreign
affiliates (i.e., FDI) on all other firms in an industry (including  joint ventures), the negative effect
lost statistical significance. The authors report that survey questionnaires  reveal that joint venture
firms invested significantly  more in new technologies  than purely domestic firms did. The authors
suggest that  purely domestic firms might have  lacked the  ability to  absorb the  technologies
introduced  by foreign firms (due  to their lower R&D efforts).
Overall, several studies have cast doubt on the view that FDI generates positive spillovers
for local firms. But such findings need not imply that host countries have nothing significant to
gain (or must lose) from FDI. The point is that reallocation of resources that accompanies  the entry
of foreign firms may not be immediate. Domestic firms should be expected to  suffer from an
increase in competition;  in fact part of benefit of inward FDI is that it can help weed out relatively
inefficient domestic firms. Resources released in this process will be put to better use by either
foreign firms with superior technologies, or efficient new entrants (both domestic and foreign), or
by some other sectors of the economy. Existing studies of spillovers may not cover a long enough
period of time to be able to accurately determine  how FDI affects turnover rates (entry and exit).
Furthermore, such horizontal  studies are  further  limited by  design since  they  cannot clarify
linkages and spillovers that may result from FDI in industries other than the one in which FDI
occurs (see more on this below). Before considering  this issue, we discuss what is perhaps a crucial
channel of internal  technology diffusion but has failed to receive much attention in the literature.
4.3. Labor turnover
While direct imitation  and reverse engineering  have been extensively  studied as channels of
inter-firm  technology  diffusion,  the role of labor turnover has been rather neglected. Labor turnover
differs from these channels because knowledge embodied in workers moves across  firms only
23through the physical movement  of workers. The relative importance of labor turnover is difficult to
establish for obvious reasons: one needs to track individuals who have worked for multinationals
regarding their future job choices and  then determine their impact  on the  productivity of new
employers.  Thus, there exist few empirical studies that attempt to measure the magnitude of labor
turnover from multinationals  to local firms. To the best of my knowledge, there exist no empirical
studies that attempt to measure the role such turnover plays in improving productivity in local
firms.
The available evidence on labor turnover itself is mixed. For example, while a  study of
Kenyan  industries  by  Gershenberg (1987)  finds  limited evidence  of  labor  turnover  from
multinationals to  local Kenyan firms, several other studies document substantial labor turnover
from multinational to local firms. The World Investment Report of  1992 discusses the case of
Bangladesh's garment industry in some detail (see also Rhee, 1990). Korea's  Daewoo supplied
Desh (the first Bangladeshi firm to manufacture and export garments) with technology  and credit. 34
Eventually, 115  of the 130 initial workers left Desh to set up their own firms, or to join other newly
established, garment companies. The remarkable speed with which the  former Desh  workers
transmitted  their know-how  to other factories clearly demonstrates the role labor turnover can play
in technology  diffusion.
Pack  (1997)  also  discusses  evidence documenting the  role  of  labor  turnover  in
disseminating  technologies  of multinationals to local firms. For example, in the mid 1980s, almost
fifty percent of all engineers and approximately sixty three percent of all skilled workers that left
multinationals, left to join local Taiwanese firms. On the other hand, the figures reported in the
Gershenberg study of Kenyan industry are smaller: of the ninety one job shifts studied, only sixteen
percent involved  turnover from multinationals  to local firms.
How does one synthesize these empirical findings? In  other words,  the cross-country
variation in labor turnover rates itself requires an explanation. One possible generalization is that
in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, local competitors are less disadvantaged relative to
their counterparts in many African economies thereby making labor turnover possible. Thus, the
ability of local firmns  to absorb technologies  introduced by multinationals  may be a key determinant
of whether or not labor turnover occurs as a means of technology diffusion in equilibrium. 35 This is
34  Thus  Desh was not a multinational  firm in the strict sense;  rather it was a domestic  firm that benefited
substantially  from its connection  with Daewoo.
35 Local investment  climate  may  be such that workers  looking  to leave  multinationals  in search  of new
opportunities  (or other local  entrepreneurs)  find it unprofitable  to start  their own  companies  implying  the
24the argument advanced in Glass and Saggi (1999b). The rationale of their model is as follows.
Since superior  technology is  one  of  the  key  intangible  assets that  permit  multinationals to
successfully compete with local firms, multinationals have an incentive to limit diffusion of their
technology to local rivals. An effective method of limiting technology diffusion is to curtail labor
turnover by offering higher wages than  local rivals offer. Thus, if multinationals are observed
paying higher wages than local firms are, the wage premiums paid by a multinational can provide a
rough estimate of the value it places on the knowledge it transfers  to  its workers. The more
interesting point is that  such a premium may either exceed or fall short of the benefit the local
economy would enjoy, if the multinational were to sit back and allow its workers to leave. Note
that if the multinational  must raise wages if it wants to restrict technology diffusion to local firms
and the wage premium has no necessary relation to the social value of the knowledge embodied  in
workers, technology diffusion is not necessarily optimal for the local economy. Thus,  policies
designed  to encourage technology  transfer do not always raise welfare of the recipient country. 36
Local  competition policy may  also  effect labor  turnover.  For  example,  according to
Bulgaria's competition  law, no person is permitted to join the management of a competing firm
operating in the same line of business as the person's original employer for the first three years
after leaving an enterprise (see Hoekman and Djankov, 1997). Of course, in many industrialized
countries, trade secrets laws protect firms against the loss of valuable information to their rival
firms. But it is difficult to  see how such laws can protect against the kind of basic technology
diffusion  that results from labor turnover from multinationals  in developing  countries.
Labor turnover rates may vary at the industry level as well. Casual observation suggests
that industries with a fast pace of technological change (such as the computer industry in Silicon
Valley) are characterized by very high turnover rates relative to more mature industries. So cross-
country  variation in  labor  turnover from  multinationals could  simply  stem  from the  global
composition of FDI:  developing countries are  unlikely to host FDI  in sectors subject to  rapid
technological  change.
only  alternative  opportunity  is to join existing  local  firms.  The presence  of weak local competitors
probably  goes  hand in hand with  the lack of entrepreneurial  efforts  since  both  may result  from the
underlying  structure  of the economic  environment.
36 It is worth  relating  these results  to those of Das (1987)  whose  investigation  of the effects  of technology
transfer  reveals  that  local firms may  lose  from such transfers  even  though  the local economy  does  not.
254.4. Vertical linkages and technology transfer
For quite some time now, it has been recognized  that multinationals may benefit the host
economy via the backward and forward linkages that they generate. However, merely documenting
extensive  linkages between multinational and local suppliers or buyers is insufficient to argue that
net benefits accrue to the local economy as a result of FDI. Rodriguez Clare (1995) develops a
formal model of linkages and shows that multinationals improve welfare  only if they generate
linkages over and beyond those generated by  local firms they  displace. Yet,  the  question of
relevance here is whether the generation of linkages is expected to result in technology diffusion. 37
While analytical modeling of such issues is scarce, there does exist limited empirical evidence in
support of the view that multinationals are involved in vertical technology transfers (Lall, 1980).
Even more interesting is the  possibility that  such vertical transfers,  when  accompanied with
spillovers, may lead to interaction between upstream and  downstream multinational firms that
encourages  industrial development. 3"
In a recent paper, Pack and Saggi (1999) emphasize  that downstream buyers in developed
country markets will benefit from technology diffusion among potential suppliers in developing
countries since such diffusion increases competition  among suppliers. In their model, by increasing
demand in the downstream market, competition caused by technology diffusion in the developing
country market may induce entry into marketing thereby increasing competition  in the downstream
Market. 39 While they do not model FDI, it is not hard to see how their model can be applied to
understand the consequences  of technology  diffusion under FDI rather than exporting.
4.5. Spillovers from  FDI: a recapitulation
A difficult challenge facing the optimistic view regarding technology spillovers from FDI
is to explain how such spillovers can ever be in the interest of the multinational firms. Clearly,
under most circumstances, multinationals  would rather limit diffusion  in the local economy. In fact,
the heart of the theory that seeks to explain the emergence  of multinationals is that such finns are
able to successfully compete with local firms precisely because they possess superior technologies,
management, and marketing. Why then would multinationals not take actions to ensure that such
37  Thus, we stay clear of the rather large literature on linkages  that does not explicitly  deal with the
question  of technology  diffusion.
38  See  Markusen  and Venables  (1999)  for a model  that abstracts  from technology  spillovers  and considers
the pecuniary  externalities  that accompany  vertical  linkages  and result in industrial  development.
39  One implication  of their analysis is that fully integrated  multinational  firms may be more averse to
technology  diffusion  than firms that are involved  in international  arms length arrangements  since they
have little  to gain  from diffusion.
26advantages do not diffuse to local competitors? Part of the answer must lie in the fact that such
actions are costly and may even entail externalities  between  multinationals. Suppose a costly action
(such as litigation  in local courts to enforce IPR protection) can indeed help limit loss of knowledge
capital for  a  multinational. A  difficulty arises  if  all potential multinationals benefit from the
curtailment of technology diffusion whereas the costs fall on only the one who takes legal action.
Thus,  the  public  good  nature  of  such  actions  suggest  that  developing  countries  hosting
multinationals may  expect the rivalry amongst such firms to indeed result in  some degree of
technology diffusion.  Of course, the preceding argument also overstates the case a bit: some loss of
knowledge will  result  despite  all  precautions.  Nevertheless, the  general  message  is  clear:
multinationals  can take actions to limit diffusion, and while making their decisions regarding where
to set up subsidiaries,  the expected costs of technology diffusion will enter their calculus of profit
maximization.
That being said, entry of multinationals may indeed be beneficial for host countries even
though it fails to result in much in the way of spillovers for local firms. In fact, the preceding
discussion suggests that spillovers  to local firms that directly compete with the multinational  would
indeed be the most elusive of benefits that host countries may expect to enjoy from FDI. Second,
the very  act  of curtailment of spillovers, may  sometimes imply that  local agents other than
domestic competitors  of multinationals  (for example local workers) may enjoy positive extemalities
from FDI. If so, the total welfare effect of FDI on local welfare may be positive despite the lack of
technology  spillovers.
Lastly, we  should note that  spillovers may  be  of an  entirely different nature:  some
empirical evidence indicates that multinational firms who penetrate foreign markets reduce entry
costs for other potential exporters (see Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison, 1997).4°  Such spillovers may
result from informational extemalities and are more likely to lower fixed costs rather than marginal
costs of production.
4.6. FDI and growth
Regardless of the channel through which technology spillovers occur, the fact that FDI
often involves capital inflows along with technology transfer  implies that  one would expect  a
positive impact of FDI on growth in the host country. Yet there are several important caveats to
this assertion. First of all, a positive correlation between the extent of FDI and economic  growth in
cross-country regressions may simply reflect the fact that FDI is attracted to countries that are
27expected to grow faster simply because it yields higher returns there. Thus, the causation could run
from growth to FDI and simultaneous equation system estimation may be needed to resolve the
issue. Second, multinationals often raise the required capital in the host country and in such a
scenario, capital inflows associated with FDI may not be substantial. An optimistic view of FDI
would  then look  to technology  transfer and/or spillovers as the mechanism through which FDI may
affect growth.
In a recent paper, Glass and Saggi (1999a) examine the question of spillovers  from FDI in
a  product cycle model. In their North-South model, the  demonstration/proximity argument is
formalized as follows: Southern finns are assumed to be able to imitate multinationals located in
the South at a lower cost than firms located in the North. However, as they point out, multinational
firms are also stronger competitors than firms that produce only in the North since multinationals
produce in the same low wage location as potential imitators. Their model delivers the surprising
result that a faster flow of FDI increases the aggregate rate of technology  transfer to the South only
if local firms lack the ability to imitate firms located in the North (i.e. if geographical proximity is
a pre-requisite for imitation). If firms in the North can be imitated, FDI does not alter aggregate
technology transfer  since imitation focusing on firms located in the North  slows down with a
hastening of imitation  targeting multinationals. 4'
In a recent, comprehensive  paper, Borensztein  et. al. (1998) utilize data on FDI flows from
industrialized countries to sixty nine developing countries to test the effect of FDI on growth in a
cross-country regression framework. Their findings are as follows. First, FDI contributes more to
domestic growth than domestic investment, suggesting that it is indeed a vehicle of technology
transfer. Second, FDI is more productive than domestic investment only when the host country has
a minimum threshold stock of human capital. The latter finding is especially interesting since it
clarifies when exactly FDI should be expected to effect growth.
Using cross  section data from forty six  developing countries, Balasubramanyam et.  al.
(1996) also investigate the effect of FDI on growth in developing  countries. They report two main
findings. First, growth enhancing effects of FDI are stronger in countries that pursued an policy of
export promotion rather than  import substitution, suggesting that the trade policy regime is an
important determinant of the effects of FDI. Second, they find that,  in countries with export
promoting trade  regimes, FDI has a  stronger effect on growth than  domestic investment. Both
40 Needless  to say, our discussion  of vertical  technology  transfer  is also relevant  here.
41 Note that the model assumes that imitation of multinationals  is always feasible; in this sense, a
threshold  level of absorptive/imitative  capacity  is assumed  on the part of Southern  firms.
28findings relate well to the results of Borensztein et. al. (1998). The second finding may be viewed
as a confirmation  of the hypothesis that FDI results in technology  transfer.
The findings of Borensztein et. al. (1998) relate well to Keller (1996) who argues that
mere access to foreign technologies may not increase growth rates of developing countries. In his
model, if a country's absorptive capacity (stock of human capital) remains unchanged, a switch to
an outward orientation  does not lead to a higher growth rate. 42
Xu  (1999) provides yet another confirmation of the argument that,  in the absence of
adequate human capital, technology  transfer from FDI may fail to increase productivity growth in
the host country. Using date on outward FDI from the United States to forty countries, Xu (1999)
finds that technology  transfer from FDI contributes to productivity growth in developed countries
but not in lesser developed countries because the latter lack adequate human capital. Incidentally,
as  Xu  (1999) notes,  FDI  may  contribute to  productivity growth due  to  reasons  other than
technology transfer. Thus,  a  statistically significant coefficient on  some measure of FDI  in a
productivity growth equation does not necessarily imply that technology  transfer is the mechanism
through which FDI  contributes to  productivity growth. Xui measures the technology transfer
intensity of MNE affiliates by their spending on royalties and license fees as a share of their gross
output and estimates that of the total effect of trade (via R&D spillovers) and FDI (via technology
transfer) on productivity growth in developed countries, forty one percent is due to technology
transfer. 4  Xu's  results for developed countries confirm the findings of Barrell and Pain (1997)
who find that FDI has a positive impact on technological change in West Germany and United
Kingdom.
5. The role ofpolicy
42 Using a model  quite different  from that of Keller's,  Glass and Saggi (1998)  focus on the issue of the
quality  of technology  transferred  via FDI. They  argue that investment  in imitation  by host country  firms
generate  the necessary  knowledge  (or skill)  foundation  for FDI, and thus factors  that promote  imitation
can promote  a higher quality  mix of FDI. While  Keller's  model stresses  that a country's  stock of human
capital effectively  constrains  its ability  to take advantage  of foreign  technologies,  Glass and Saggi (1998)
emphasize  that indigenous  technological  capability  in an industry  effectively  constrains  a country's  ability
to host foreign  technology.  Thus the latter  paper takes a more disaggregated  view of the constraints  on
technology  transfer  relative  to the former  although  they make similar  points.  For example,  a country  may
have  a fair amount  of human  capital in the aggregate  but may  lack the technological  sophistication  in any
particular  industry  to  be able to host high quality  FDI.
43 In an earlier paper, Xu and Wang (1999) study the role of capital goods trade in generating  R&D
spillovers  in OECD  countries.
29What does existing literature tell us about the role policy plays in process of international
technology transfer? Clearly, the range of policies that  can be  considered is rather  large. We
restrict attention  to trade, FDI, and IPR policy.
5.1. Tradepolicy
While the literature on trade policy is voluminous, the interaction between protection and
technology transfer has not received significant attention. In fact, most existing models, treat the
process of technology transfer in a rather rudimentary way and have focused instead on  other
aspects of the problem that are interesting in their own right, but not of central concem for this
paper. Below, a few prominent examples  of this line of research are discussed.
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) examine a domestic firm's incentives for technology adoption
given the existence of a superior technology  that has already been adopted by a foreign rival. The
cost of adoption is assumed to decline over time and the main interest is in examining how the
nature (tariff versus quota) and the duration (temporary versus permanent) of trade protection
imfluence  the domestic firm's incentive for technology adoption. The most interesting result in the
paper is that temporary protection (i.e. protection that is removed  upon successful adoption  by the
domestic  firm) actually delays the date of technology  adoption.'
The literature has also investigated  the effect of trade protection in models of R&D based
models of endogenous  growth (Grossman and Helpman, 1991 and 1995, are excellent references).
As  can  be  expected from  models  in  which  increasing returns,  imperfect competition, and
externalities play a central role, results depend upon the details of a particular model and require
careful interpretation. To the extent one can draw a  general conclusion from such a  complex
literature, it  is  that  the  literature does not  provide an  unconditional argument against trade
protection. As emphasized in section 2, conclusions  hinge dramatically on the scope of knowledge
spillovers: international  knowledge  spillovers strongly tilt the balance in favor of free trade whereas
national spillovers create a role for policy intervention that can combat path dependence  resulting
from historical accident. For example, if productivity improvements  depend only upon a country's
own R&D, a case can be made for policies that ensure that industries in which such improvements
occur at a rapid rate are not all located elsewhere.
44 In a related  paper, Miyagiwa  and Ohno (forthcoming),  show  that if temporary  protection  is credible,  it
may indeed increase R&D relative to free trade. On the other hand, if the domestic  firm expects  that
protection  will be removed  early should innovation  occur before the pre-announced  terminal date of
protection,  it invests  less  in R&D  under  protection  relative  to free trade. Similarly,  as first emphasized  by
30In a recent interesting paper, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (forthcoming)  develop a specific-
factor variant of the  'quality  ladders' model of endogenous growth without scale effects and
examine the consequences  of contingent protection (tariffs imposed on imports whenever  domestic
firns  lose their technological leadership to foreign firms who successfully innovate over them).
Their approach is interesting because protection in the real world is usually not marginal (for
example, antidumping duties may be levied on foreign firms with the explicit goal of providing
sufficient relief to domestic industry). Somewhat interestingly, they find that tariffs that allow
domestic firms to  capture  the  domestic market  are  positively related  to  the  global  rate  of
technological  change in the short run.4
5.2 FDI Policies
There is no simple way of describing the policy environment  that faces multinationals in
developing countries today and indeed this  has almost always been the case. In countries that
historically  emphasized import  substituting  industrialization such  as  most  of  Africa,  Latin
America, and Southeast Asia, FDI was either completely  prohibited or multinational firms had to
operate under severe restrictions. Restrictive FDI policies were often pursued within the context of
a larger strategy of import substitution and a central goal of such policies was to encourage the
development  of local firms. In fact, even in countries where technology acquisition was a  major
policy objective, multinationals  were rarely permitted to operate wholly owned subsidiaries: Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan all  imposed restrictions on FDI  at various points in time. In other words,
outward oriented' economies  were not particularly keen on allowing multinational firms into their
markets. The Ministry of International Trade and  Investment (MITI) played an active role in
Japan's acquisition  of foreign technology.  It limited competition  between potential Japanese buyers,
did not allow inward FDI until 1970, never greatly liberalized it, and even insisted at times that
foreign firms share their technology with local firms as a precondition for doing business in Japan.
Matsuyama  (1990),  if the domestic  firm expects  protection  to be extended  in case of no innovation  by
terminal  date, its investment  incentives  are marred  by protection.
45 Grossman  and Helpman (1991) also analyze  the effects of tariff protection  in a two-country  quality
ladders  model.  However,  unlike  Dinopoulos  and Segerstrom,  they only  analyze  tariffs  that are too small  to
allow domestic  firms to capture the narket. Both models  assume Bertrand competition  on the product
market so that a low quality  firm can monopolize  the market  only if a tariff of sufficient  magnitude  is
imposed  on higher  quality  imports.  A small  tariff  can extract  rents from foreign  firms but fails to  protect
domestic  firms who have been innovated  over  by foreign  finns. It should  be noted that Dinopoulos  and
Segerstrom's  analysis  assumes  that  both countries  adopt  symmetric.
3146 In contrast to the restrictive stance toward FDI, licensing  of foreign technology was aggressively
encouraged  (Layton, 1982). South Korea's experience  has also been quite similar. 47
What, if any, is the rationale behind policies that discourage FDI? Pack and Saggi (1997)
argue that by prohibiting FDI  and placing other restrictions on the  conduct of multinationals,
government  policies in many countries may have effectively weakened the bargaining position of
foreign firms. They note that in Japan, MITI actively restricted many local firms from participating
as potential buyers for this reason. But why treat technology licensing more favorably relative to
FDI? Saggi (1999) suggests that the answer to this may have something to do with encouraging
technological  development  of indigenous  firms. 48
Sometimes  policy has also favored joint ventures relative to wholly owned subsidiaries of
multinationals. 49 Why might this be so? Of course, an immediate  possibility is that all such policies
simply reflect protectionism:  large public firms or hitherto protected private firms may not be able
to compete with multinationals and are able to  secure protection through the political process.
However, is it also possible that joint ventures (as well as technology licensing) lead to more local
involvement and therefore greater technology spillovers to local agents? Blomstrom and Sjoholm
(1999) address this question in a recent empirical paper. Using plant level data for  1991 for all
Indonesian establishments  with more than 20 employees,  this study focuses on two main questions.
First, do establishments with minority and majority ownership (i.e. joint ventures versus wholly
owned subsidiaries) differ in terms of their (labor) productivity levels? Second, does the degree of
technology spillovers vary with the extent of foreign ownership? Clearly, the second question is
crucial for our purposes. The results of this study are interesting. First, as in many other previous
46  Ozawa  (1974) provides  a rich description  of the role imported  technology  and local R&D (aimed  at
facilitating  absorption  of foreign  technology)  played  in Japan's  economic  development.
47 For example,  while annual inflows  of licensed  technology  increased  steadily  during the 70s and 80s,
FDI inflows  into South Korea, which  were always  relatively  low, stagnated  during 1978-1983  whereas
annual inflows  of licensed  technology  as measured  by royalty  payments  increased  steadily  during  the 70s
and 80s (Sakong,  1993).  This slowdown  of FDI  into South  Korea  was partially  a result of restrictive  FDI
policies instituted  by the Korean government  during that period. See also Hobday (1996) for further
details  on South  Korea's  experience.
48 This paper develops  a two-period  model  where a foreign  firm chooses  between  FDI and technology
licensing.  The key assumption  is that licensing  results  in greater  transfer  of know-how  to the local firm
than does FDI, under which it must compete  with the subsidiary  of the multinational  firm. The main
result is that the local firm would  have the strongest  incentive  for innovation  if the foreign  finn were to
follow  initial  licensing  by direct  investment.  However,  in equilibrium,  the foreign  firm never adopts  such
a course  of action.  Therefore,  the model  provides  some  insight  into the frequently  expressed  preference  for
licensing  over  direct  investment.
49  The Chinese govemnment  has been particularly  interventionist  in technology  transactions  and has
encouraged  FDI in the form of joint ventures.  While wholly  owned subsidiaries  are not prohibited,  the
policy environment favors joint ventures over such enterprises.
32studies, labor productivity is found to be higher in establishments  with foreign equity than in purely
domestic firms.  Second, the  extent  of total  foreign production  is  positively associated with
productivity of domestic firms, suggesting some sort of spillovers from FDI. And third, the degree
of foreign ownership does not seem to affect either the productivity of firms that get foreign equity
or the extent of spillovers to the domestic sector. Thus these findings do not support the hypothesis
that joint  ventures differ  substantially from  wholly owned subsidiaries. Yet  the  findings are
puzzling: clearly the degree of foreign participation seems to matter in that plants with no foreign
investment are less productive. Perhaps, the results suggest some sort of threshold effects, beyond
a  certain degree of foreign ownership, additional foreign equity does not affect productivity or
spillovers. 50
As noted earlier, the work by Djankov and Hoekman (1999) also uncovers an interesting
role for joint ventures and suggests that such enterprises  may have greater ability to absorb foreign
technologies than  purely domestic firms.  Hoekman and  Saggi (1999) suggest that,  while the
motivation behind policies that discriminate between licensing,  joint ventures, and establishment of
wholly owned subsidiaries is not easy to decipher, a plausible interpretation may  be that  such
policies seek to maximize technology transfer to local firms while limiting the rent erosion that
results from the entry of multinational  firms.
To take another policy issue, many South-East Asian countries still do not allow free entry
of multinational  firms and often express preferences  with regard to the type of FDI: entry by Pepsi
or Coke is viewed differently from entry by GM or Texas Instruments. Unfortunately,  there is little
in the literature that helps us understand such policies. Other than  the standard argument that
certain industries are able to secure greater protection for themselves than others, perhaps it may
also be the case that spillovers to the local economy are higher under certain types of FDI than
others. 5 The latter argument is closely related to the idea of industrial targeting in general and the
pitfalls of the government  being able to correctly identify 'high spillover' industries are all too well
known to need further discussion  here.
50  The authors do not report the minimum  level of foreign equity  (for those plants that do get foreign
equity)  in their sample.  Also,  one must keep in mind  that the study  only  measures  labor  productivity  and
treats some  important  endogenous  variables  as exogenous.  Overall,  it seems  fair to say that the question
remains  an open one. Several  earlier  studies  (Mansfield  and Romeo,  1980,  for example)  have documented
that technologies  transferred to  wholly owned subsidiaries are of a  newer vintage than  licensed
technologies  or those  transferred  to  joint ventures  (see also  Kabiraj  and Marjit, 1995,  and Saggi, 1996  for
relevant  theoretical  models).
33Despite the  subtle  policy  interventions outlined above,  when  measured by  a  broad
yardstick, overall government  policy has become more liberal across the world. For example, as of
1997, there existed 1513 bilateral  investment treaties among countries compared to  400 seven
years earlier (UNCTAD, 1998). Economic reform in many formerly communist countries has
added to the list of countries vying for FDI. Coupled with this rise in treaties is the proliferation of
the use of fiscal and financial incentives in both industrialized and developing countries to lure in
FDI. Such overly optimistic policies carry dangers of their own and may very well reduce welfare
in host countries. While a  case for such policies can indeed be made on the basis of positive
externalities  from FDI, as noted earlier, convincing  evidence  on this front is missing. 52
5.3. Intellectual property rights protection
Common sense suggests that if any policy variable should affect international technology
transfer, it ought to be the host country's intellectual  property rights (IPRs) regime. The theoretical
literature has investigated  the affect of IPR enforcement on technology  transfer and FDI in several
endogenous growth models. 53 To limit the  scope  of the  discussion, I  omit models in  which
technology  transfer does not play a central role. Several of the papers are linked  via their use of the
two models used intensively  by Grossman and Helpman (1991). Before turning to these, I discuss
the work of Taylor (1994) since it differs from the other papers in that it employs a model of
endogenous technological change and  transfer  with  Ricardian features.  Taylor  examines two
scenarios: one in which IPR enforcement  is symmetric (applies to innovators regardless of country
of origin) across the two regions and one in which it is asymmetric (only domestic innovators are
protected). While his analysis is conducted under the assumption of costless technology transfer
and equal productivity in R&D in the two countries, his results hold even when both assumptions
5'  One may speculate  that domestic  content protection  policies  for example  hope to involve  more local
firms and therefore  generate  greater  spillovers.  However,  there is no formal model  or empirical  evidence
that supports  this position.
52  See Barry and Bradley (1997) for details regarding Ireland's experience  with FDI. Both favorable
policies  (reduced  taxes  and trade barriers, investment  grants etc.) as well as strong  fundamentals  (such as
infrastructure,  educated  labor force  etc.) seem  to have  played a role in attracting  export-catering  FDI to
Ireland.  The strong  performance  of the Irish economy  since  the mid-1980s  is attributable  to both strong
fundamentals  as well as significant  FDI  inflows  into Ireland.
53  In a  strategic, partial equilibrium model, Vishwasrao (1995) argues that the lack of adequate
enforcement  of technology  transfer  agreements  may encourage  FDI relative  to licensing.  In her screening
model,  depending  upon the type  of the licensee,  licensing  may  or may not lead to imitation.  The trade-off
between  FDI  and licensing  is that FDI avoids  risk of imitation  at the expense  of higher  production  costs.
34are dropped making it possible to apply them to a North-South setting. 54 His major result is that
asymmetric protection of IPRs distorts the pattern of both trade  in goods as well as R&D and
lowers the global rate of growth.
Interpreting  the exogenous rate of imitation as a proxy for the level of IPR enforcement in
the South, Helpman (1993) shows that a decline in the intensity of imitation promotes FDI (with
innovation exogenous). 55 However, the major contribution of Helpman's work lies in providing the
first detailed welfare analysis of IPR enforcement in the South (as  measured by  an exogenous
decline in the rate of imitation) in a dynaric  general equilibrium growth model. He shows that a
strengthening of IPR protection is not in the interest of the South and that imitation may even
benefit the North provided the rate of imitation is not too fast. Lai (1998) extends the Helpman
model to allow for FDI and shows that innovation is promoted along with FDI. The common
weakness of both models is that stronger IPR enforcement is modeled as an exogenous decline in
the rate of imitation.  Nevertheless,  Helpman's  model is a tour de force in that it specifies clearly the
alternative channels  via which a strengthening  of Southern IPR protection affects world welfare.
In a recent paper, Yang and Maskus (1999) study the effects of Southern IPR enforcement
on the rate of innovation in the North as well as on the extent of technology licensing  undertaken by
them. A key assumption in their model is that increased IPR enforcement increases the licenser's
share of rents and reduces costs of enforcing licensing contracts, thereby making licensing more
attractive. Consequently,  both innovation and licensing  increase with stronger IPR protection in the
South.
The  main  contribution of  Glass  and  Saggi  (1999c) is  that  they  treat  stronger  IPR
protection as an endogenous decline in imitation due to increased imitation costs (stemming  from
stricter uniqueness  requirements)  where Southern imitation  targets both multinationals producing in
the  South and  purely Northern  firms producing in the  North. 56 They  find that  FDI  actually
decreases with a  strengthening of Southern IPR protection because  an increase in the  cost of
imitation crowds out FDI  through tighter  Southern resource scarcity. Less  efficient imitation
54  A  subtle qualification  that must be made: symmetric versus asymmetric treatment implies both
countries  adopting  one policy  as opposed  to another. Incentives  for unilateral  adoption  of a symmetric
policy  are not analyzed  in Taylor's  model.
55  Krugman  (1979)  addressed  the issue  as well,  although  his model  had a greater  degree of exogenity  than
Helpman's.
56  While products  like books, videos  and CDs receive  much press about conflicts over IPR protection,
imitating  most products  is not so simple  (see  Pack and Westphal,  1986).  Empirical  evidence  indicates  that
imitation  is indeed  a costly  activity  for a wide range of high technology  goods,  such as chemicals,  drugs,
35absorbs more resources despite the reduction  in the rate of imitation due to the reduced profitability
of imitation. Additionally,  the contraction in FDI tightens resource scarcity in the North: increased
production leaves fewer resources for innovation, so the rate of innovation  falls. 5
It is worth emphasizing  that if strengthening  of Southern IPR protection increases the cost
of imitation  targeting both firms producing in the North as well as multinationals producing in the
South, Northern incentives for FDI  (at the firm level) are basically unaffected. How does one
reconcile this result with the positive effect of  increased IPR enforcement on  FDI frequently
emphasized in empirical work (see Lee and Mansfield, 1996)? There are two ways out.  First,
increased IPR enforcement may be asymmetrical in that firms who invest in a country can expect
to have a greater say in local courts relative to those that simply export. Second, imitation of firms
located in the North may simply not be an option for host country firms (as may be the case for
relatively  poorer countries) so that any increased IPR enforcement  affects only multinational  firms.
As Ferrantino (1993) has noted, all of the preceding models suffer from a  fundamental
problem: either FDI or  licensing is the only channel via which northern firms are allowed to
produce in the South. 58 A more complete treatment of FDI requires that Northern firms be given
the  option  of  transacting  in  technology  via  they  market.  What  are  the  consequences of
strengthening  IPR protection in the South if northern firms can choose between licensing and FDI?
Does FDI increase with IPR enforcement or does such a policy change encourage licensing by
lowering  the risk of opportunism in market transactions? The latter scenario is equally likely and
studies that completely ignore the possibility of licensing (or joint ventures for that matter) are
likely to overstate the effect of IPR enforcement on inward FDI. In fact, a  more subtle analysis
may be needed. Increased IPR enforcement in the South may indeed make it a more attractive
location for production (thereby  increasing FDI relative to exports) but the technologies  transferred
for that purpose may flow through licensing rather than FDI so that the net effect on technology
transfer via FDI is ambiguous. Of course, aggregate technology transfer to the South may very
electronics  and machinery.  For example,  Mansfield  et al. (1981)  find that the costs  of imitation  average  65
percent of the costs  of innovation  (and  very  few  products  were  below  20 percent).
5'  All of these  models  do not study  the interaction  between  optimal  policies  in the two  regions.  In a recent
paper, Lai and Qiu (1999) attempt this task and show that the South's  optimal IPR protection  level is
lower  than that of the North. More importantly,  global  welfare  may very  well suffer  if the South  is forced
to adopt  the Northern  standard.
58 Maskus  and Penubarti (1995) ignore FDI all together and study the effect of IPR regimes  on trade.
Using  data for 1984,  they ask whether  the distribution  of bilateral  trade across  nations  depends  upon the
IPR regimes  of importing  countries.  The find  that within the group  of large developing  countries,  stronger
IPR regimes  attract  larger  than expected  flows  of imports  from OECD  countries.
36well  increase,  although general  equilibrium effects  may  also  require  qualifications of  this
conclusion (Glass and Saggi, 1999c).
Using data for 1982 on US exports and sales of overseas affiliates of US firms, Ferrantino
(1993) presents a detailed cross-country study that attempts to identify the determinants of both
exports and sales of multinational affiliates of US firms, as suggested by the gravity model. His
analysis reveals many insights but perhaps the most interesting finding is that the US exports more
to its affiliates in countries that are non-adherents. Ferrantino (1993) suggests that this may reflect
a  desire to conceal infonnation about the production process by confining production within the
borders  of  the  US.  This  interpretation fits  well  with  a  central  idea  theme  of  this  paper:
multinational firms will adjust their strategies to optimize against policies and market conditions
they  face  in  various  host  countries, casting doubts  about  the  conclusions of  empirical (or
theoretical) work that treats FDI as given.
Empirical evidence also indicates that the level of IPR protection in a country also affects
the composition of FDI in two different ways (Lee and Mansfield, 1996, Smarzynska, 1999b).
First, industries in which IPRs are crucial (pharmaceuticals for example), firms may refrain from
investing in countries a  weak regime of IPR protection. Second, regardless of the  industry in
question, multinationals are less likely to set up  manufacturing and R&D facilities in countries
with IPR regimes and more likely to set up sales and marketing ventures, since the latter run no
risk of technology  leakage.
The above studies present useful findings but are unable to  address perhaps the most
central of questions: does a  country's IPR regime affect  its  economic growth? While  several
theoretical analyses of this question exist, empirical studies are scarce. One such study is Gould
and Gruben (1996). Using cross-country data on patent protection, trade regime, and economic
fundamentals, these  authors report that IPR  protection, as measured by  the  degree of patent
protection, is an important determinant of economic growth. Somewhat more interestingly, they
report that the effect is  stronger for  relatively open economies than  it is for  relatively closed
economies.  In other words, a strengthening  of IPR protection is more conducive for growth if it is
accompanied  by trade liberalization. A possible interpretation of this finding is that, by increasing
foreign competition,  trade liberalization not only curtails monopoly  power granted by IPRs but also
ensures that such monopoly power is obtained only if the innovation is truly global. If firms in
37other countries can export freely to the domestic market and have better products or technologies, a
domestic patent is quite useless in granting monopoly  power. 5 9
6. Conclusions
This paper has covered a rather large terrain. It is worth emphasizing  the main points in easily
digestible form:
*  The role of trade in encouraging growth hinges critically on the geographical scope (national
versus international) of knowledge spillovers. Empirical studies have not yet settled the issue;
the truth may simply be that for developing countries, spillovers are even more national in
scope than  for  industrialized countries. Consequently, whether R&D  and  high technology
production is carried out in close geographical proximity to a country may indeed matter for
development.
*  Little is known about the relative role of trade and FDI (with licensing,  joint ventures etc. as
special cases) as mechanisms of technology  transfer. Given that foreign firms opt to produce in
a developing  country, FDI seems to be the preferred route and is therefore a prominent channel
of technology  transfer.
*  A well-developed  paradigm (OLI) seeks to explain the emergence  of multinational firms, given
the existence of viable alternatives such as exports, licensing,  and joint ventures. This is useful
approach for explaining static issues. The dynamic choice between alternative modes has not
been adequately explored  even in theory, let alone data.
*  Local policy frequently makes pure FDI infeasible forcing foreign firms to opt for licensing  or
joint ventures. Empirical evidence supporting the idea that  the latter modes of technology
transfer lead to more learning by local firms is scant or completely missing. To be fair, few
careful studies  have attempted this difficult task. So the jury may be still out.
*  Policies designed  to lure in FDI have proliferated in recent years. If the case for such policies
rests on positive spillovers from FDI to domestic firms, then the case may be rather weak.
Several recent plant level studies have failed to  find positive spillovers from FDI to  firms
competing directly with subsidiaries of multinationals. However, these studies need a careful
interpretation since they treat FDI as exogenous. Second, FDI spillovers may have a vertical
nature rather than the horizontal nature assumed in such studies. Furthermore, all such studies
find that the subsidiaries of multinationals are more productive than  domestic firms. Thus,
regardless of the evidence on the spillover issue, FDI does result in a more effective use of
resources in host countries.
*  Several studies (both theoretical and empirical) indicate that absorptive capacity in the host
country is crucial for obtaining significant benefits from FDI. Without adequate human capital
or investments  in R&D, spillovers  from FDI may simply be infeasible. In fact, this may be the
most robust finding of the literature discussed in the paper. Thus, liberalization of trade and
FDI policies may need to be complemented  by  appropriate policy changes with respect to
education, R&D, and human capital accumulation, if developing countries are to take  full
advantage of increased  trade and FDI.
59  Using data from Mexican manufacturing  firms, Tybout and  Westbrook (1995) find that  trade
liberalization  was  associated  with higher  rates  of productivity  growth.
38*  IPR policy may alter the composition  of FDI both at the industry level as well as the firm level.
Industries in which IPRs are crucial, firms may refrain from FDI if IPR protection is weak in
the host country or they may not invest in manufacturing and R&D activities. Lastly, IPR
policy may  also  affect  the  mode  of  technology transfer  (licensing, joint  ventures,  or
establishment  of wholly  owned subsidiaries).
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WPS2342  What  Can  We Learn  about  Country  Martin  Ravallion  May  2000  P. Sader
Performance  from Conditional  33902
Comparisons  across  Countries?
WPS2343  Ownership  and Performance  of  David  A. Grigorian  May  2000  D. Brown
Lithuanian  Enterprises  33542
WPS2344 Designing  Direct  Subsidies  for  Vivien  Foster  May  2000  S. Delgado
Water  and Sanitation  Services:  Andres  G6mez-Lobo  37840
Panama-A Case  Study  Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2345 Information  and Modeling  Issues  in  Andres  G6mez-Lobo  May  2000  S. Delgado
Designing  Water  and Sanitation  Vivien  Foster  37840
Subsidy  Schemes  Jonathan  Halpern
WPS2346  The Middle  Class  Consensus  and  William  Easterly  May  2000  K. Labrie
Economic  Deve!opment  31001
WPS2347  Terror  as a Bargaining  Instrument:  Francis  Bloch  May  2000  P. Sader
A Case  Study  of Dowry  Violence  in  Vijayendra  Rao  33902
Rural  India
WPS2348  Taxing Issues  with Privatization:  Jack M. Mintz  May  2000  G. Chenet-Smith
A Checklist  Duanjie  Chen  36370
Evangelia  Zorotheos